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The Role of the Chief Executive in Domestic Administration
Peter L. Strauss*

The nomination of United States Solicitor General Elena Kagan to the vacant seat on our
Supreme Court coincided with the Supreme Court’s extended consideration of what many
regarded as potentially the most important decision concerning the President’s necessary role in
relation to domestic agency action in decades. In a long article on her administrative law
scholarship appearing in the New York Times shortly after her nomination, Pulitzer Prizewinning reporter Charlie Savage – a strident critic of President George W. Bush’s uses of
executive authority1 – wrote:
For decades, presidents of both parties have sought to impose greater White
House control over the federal agencies that regulate matters like workplace rules,
food and drug safety, and protections for natural resources. Elena Kagan, the
Supreme Court nominee, has been a strong supporter of such efforts to expand
presidential power over domestic affairs, her writings show. ... Ms. Kagan’s
views place her within the center of a debate about the balance between making
the bureaucracy more responsive to national elections and fears that excessive
politicization could trump neutral expertise. 2
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board had been argued in the
Supreme Court (by Solicitor General Kagan) early last December, and was decided June 28, 2010
– the last day of the Supreme Court’s sitting for the current argument year,3 on the very day
Senate hearings on her confirmation began, and five days after the conference for which this
paper was written.
The case questioned the constitutionality of a particular form of government entity Congress
had created to oversee the business of public company accounting. Pre-crash scandals such as
Enron and World-Com had revealed the inadequacies of the accountancy profession’s efforts at
self-regulation. As accountancy principles had particular importance for the auditing of public
companies whose shares were subject to the regulation of the Securities & Exchange
Commission [SEC], one of America’s “independent regulatory commissions,” Congress had
created a new multi-member body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB],
to be named and extensively overseen by the SEC – in effect an independent commission within
an independent commission. Had they placed this Board, invested with powers of rulemaking,
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enforcement and adjudication under the careful and unusually extensive oversight of the SEC,
so far away from the presidency as to defeat our Constitution’s vesting of “the executive Power
... in a President of the United States”?4 What is the executive power, anyway, and how can we
have arrived a decade into the Twenty-First Century under an Eighteenth Century Constitution
without knowing the answer to that question?
That the case took over six months for the Court to issue its opinions can be taken as a signal
of its difficulty. The last part of this paper, that could hardly have been presented at the
Conference, essays a preliminary analysis of the two opinions in the case – a majority opinion
written by Chief Justice Roberts for what is conventionally regarded as the conservative wing of
the Court (himself and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas) and a dissent written by
Justice Breyer for the more liberal four (himself and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens.)
The disagreement was evidently deeply felt; Justice Breyer took the unusual step of reading his
dissent from the bench when the decision was announced. Yet, as will be seen, the result was
hardly as dramatic as some had hoped for, and the apparently deliberate ambiguities of the
majority opinion leave for the future the task of reconciling the ostensible theory of its actions
with the realities of common government arrangements.
What precedes this discussion will, it is hope, illuminate the general framework of our
Constitution’s provision for a single, elected chief executive – at the head now of an enormously
complex and varied apparatus of government that the Constitution’s framers could never have
anticipated – and the continuing controversies over just how powerful a position his is in relation
to the activities of domestic government.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONSTITUTION
Other than establishing his office and vesting in him “the executive power,” the
Constitution’s text says remarkably little about how it is to be exercised, and virtually nothing
about government itself. After its vesting clause, Article II gives the bulk of its attention to the
President’s election, necessary qualifications, wages, and oath of office. The diction of the
remaining paragraphs suggests, if anything, that he has relatively little command authority over
domestic affairs. Its second section, three paragraphs devoted to his powers, makes him
“Commander in Chief” of the nation’s military; as to his relation with domestic government,
however, it says only that he “may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each
of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.”5 He does not have personal authority to people government with those he would prefer,
unless Congress grants that authority to him for specified, less important positions: “with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate” he is to appoint “Officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”6 He has limited
power to force legislative action; where the Prime Minister in a parliamentary democracy can
herself place draft legislation on the parliamentary agenda, in substantial certainty of its passage
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if she wishes to hazard her government’s continuation on the event, our President may merely
“recommend to [Congress’] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient.”7 Members of Congress have actually to place any “measure” on the legislative
calendar, and are free to change the President’s drafts as they wish even before introducing them
– knowing that their terms in office cannot be affected by the measure’s failure. Finally,
sandwiched between commands that he “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” and
“Commission all the Officers of the United States” is the President’s obligation to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”8
Although this language twice refers to “Departments,” as does the clause vesting general
authority in the Congress to adopt whatever laws are “necessary and proper” for carrying its
legislative powers “into Execution,”9 it is a striking feature of our Constitution that it makes no
provision whatever for the executive government, as such – just the President. From the
constitutional convention’s emphatic choice of this single, elected executive official to be the
head of government, in preference to a council of state, and from the convention’s consequent
vesting of “executive Power” solely in him, some have fashioned arguments that he must be
regarded, essentially, as “Commander in Chief” of domestic government, as he explicitly is of
the military.10 From the contrast between the authority of a “Commander in Chief” and the
apparently responsibility-conceding power to ask an “Opinion, in writing” of other executive
officials having “Duties,” as well as from the passive wording of the “take care” clause (“be
faithfully executed,” as if by someone else), and from concerns about the location of excessive
power in one person, others – myself included11 – have understood his appropriate relationship
to domestic government as one of oversight, not decision. In between are those scholars,
including Justice-to-be Kagan, who find reason in the contemporary circumstances of
government to recognize a presumptive right of the President to control departmental action, that
might be replaced by the weaker responsibility to oversee should Congress explicitly so
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Id., sec. 3.
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provide.12 When Congress creates an “independent regulatory commission,” that is an example
of such a provision; most these days would concede, as the Supreme Court has several times said,
that that these bodies are elements of the executive branch – but elements at a farther remove
from the President than cabinet Departments.
AFTER THE APPOINTMENT IS MADE
Two sorts of authority the President might enjoy over those he appoints to office are the
power to substitute his judgment for theirs – the power to command in the military sense, where
disobedience is unlawful – and the power to remove from office an official of whose actions he
disapproves. The “opinion in writing” clause is certainly suggestive as to the first – legal
authority, the duty to act, is where Congress puts it. As to removal, the text is wholly silent. The
early practices of Presidents and Congresses provide some grist for every mill. As Gordon Wood
remarks in a recent book,13 there was considerable uncertainty whether the drafters had merely
recreated the English monarch in an elective context, or had established a weaker role. Congress
quickly created offices, in the Treasury Department in particular, that were quite remote from the
presidency. Presidents acted as if they could control, for example, the bringing or suspending
of prosecutions for federal crime, but with prosecutions decentralized they had to find a
complaisant US attorney to accomplish this, and Congress could grant roles to private citizens
or state officials who would not be within reach of his disciplinary capacities.14 This is an issue
that would be hard to litigate, as such; but it may be noted, as expanded upon within, that when
courts review administrative action it is inevitably reviewed as if it were the administrator’s
decision, justified or not on the basis the administrator has chosen to express, and limited to the
considerations her particular statute authorizes her to consider.
The President’s power to remove from office federal officials of whose work he disapproves
is unstated in the Constitution but implicit in his appointment power. Whether and in what ways
Congress may lawfully limit has been litigated with some frequency and was, indeed, the central
question in the PCAOB case. Those issues are taken up below. For the moment, the thing to
note is that any legal power the President has to remove government officials may influence how
they choose to act, but is not identical with the power himself to take the action a statute assigns
to them. Removal of an official with responsibilities for given policies, out of a disagreement
with how she is implementing those policies, may be discouraged by its high political cost and
by the necessity to secure Senate approval of a replacement official’s appointment; and officers
who might be removed for failing to act as the President wishes will be aware of these
inhibitions, and of the corresponding room they may have for acting on their own understanding
of law and policy.
A particularly dramatic illustration occurred in October of 1973, the so-called “Saturday
Night Massacre.” Attorney General Elliott Richardson and his Deputy William Ruckleshaus had
undertaken to the Senate Judiciary Committee that they would not interfere with the independent
investigation of the Watergate break-in then being conducted by Archibald Cox. President
12
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Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv.L.Rev. 2245 (2001).
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Nixon, perhaps aware of the contents of tapes whose disclosure Cox was seeking, and which
would eventually force his resignation, wanted Cox fired and his investigation closed down.
Although the newspaper accounts, when Cox was fired, tended to say it was the President who
did it, he knew this was not an action he could take directly. Only the Attorney General could
actually do the firing, and both Richardson and Ruckleshaus refused (having given their promises
to the Senate committee), and resigned in protest. It took an order from Solicitor General Robert
Bork (who immediately, automatically became the Acting Attorney General, and who had made
no such promises) to achieve the President’s ends – at an enormous political cost to the
President.15
A lesser example, but one directly tied to policy concerns, arose during Ronald Reagan’s
presidency. The first administrator he appointed to head the Environmental Protection Agency,
Anne Gorsuch, presumably reflected his personal preferences respecting environmental policy.
When she resigned under fierce political pressure from Congress and environmentalists
concerned that she was dismembering the agency, he appointed Ruckleshaus (who had also
served President Nixon as the EPA’s first head) to take her place. He could have had great
confidence that Ruckleshaus would win confirmation, as his views were much friendlier to
environmental matters than Ms. Gorsuch’s. But with a committed environmentalist in office, one
who had shown he knew how to stand on his principles, would the President be free to have
environmental matters decided just as he might prefer? Congressional preferences about
environmental policy continued to limit the President’s options. Ruckleshaus’s successors during
Republican administrations, Lee Thomas and William Reilly, were cut of similar cloth.
CENTRALIZED COORDINATION ? DIRECTION ? OF RULEMAKING
Perhaps precisely for this reason – because Presidents did not have, and knew they did not
have, direct control over the outputs of the many administrative agencies Congress had created
actually to implement particular policies it had legislated – recent decades have seen the steady
growth of a White House mechanism for coordination, and perhaps control, of governmental
policy-making. At least equally the product of the increasing importance of rulemaking,
manifested following the 1970s’ dramatic growth in health, environmental and safety regulation,
the processes now embodied in Executive Order 12,866 began to emerge in the Nixon
administration, and have grown steadily in stringency and breadth ever since. All agencies
(including in this respect the independent commissions) are under an obligation, not yet much
developed in practice, to participate in an annual process for government-wide development of
a regulatory plan. Once particular regulations of a defined importance are under development,
the elements of the Executive Order that have proved the more important in practice require
executive agencies (but not yet the independent commissions) to coordinate extensively with the
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs [OIRA] (an element of the larger
Office of Management Budget; OMB has long been the President’s agent for coordinating
legislative proposals, including budgetary submissions). OIRA supervises the agencies’
performance of “cost-benefit analyses.” While the language of the executive order is careful to
acknowledge agency responsibility for any regulation that may ultimately be adopted (and courts

15
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review those regulations as agency actions, indifferent to the possibility that presidential
interventions may have altered their ultimate shape),16 a command element has long been
suspected.17
Congress, seeing this expansion of presidential participation in work it had assigned to others,
has reacted in a variety of ways. It early converted the Administrator of OIRA into an official
whose appointment required senatorial confirmation – not likely a constitutional requirement but,
rather, a means of encouraging broadly acceptable appointments, and of securing promises that
might contribute some independence and objectivity. It has twice refused to confirm presidential
nominations to the office, and delayed others – a particularly unusual action for someone directly
serving the President. And it has in effect conditioned its continuing acceptance of OIRA’s
operations on high levels of professionalism in its staff and an unusual degree of transparency
in its operation.
A quite recent development illustrates both OIRA’s influence, and how this congressionally
demanded transparency, to which the Obama administration has repeatedly committed itself, may
operate to moderate it. A terrible accident a few years ago released 5.4 million cubic yards of
coal ash, a byproduct of coal combustion, into waterways from an impoundment at a Kingston,
Tennessee electric power plant, fouling downstream properties. Quite apart from its immediate
destructive impacts on aquatic life and riverside properties, coal ash can contain arsenic, lead,
chromium, and other heavy metals, and reports have linked exposure to these toxic components
to cancer and other health problems.18 After lengthy delays that may themselves have reflected
White House pressures, EPA sent OIRA a draft regulation treating coal ash as hazardous waste.
Under subtitle C of the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), designation
of coal ash as hazardous waste would mean that disposal and care would be closely supervised
by federal authorities.
An unusually lengthy and apparently controversial period of internal consideration followed.
OIRA publicly commits itself to a 90-day turn-around of such drafts – 120 days, if the
rulemaking agency agrees. It uses this time not only for its own review, but also to coordinate
with other agencies (the Department of Agriculture, for example) whose interests may be
affected. One readily understands the need for coordination in a complex world, and OMB
generally – OIRA for the rulemaking function – has been an important presidential means of
securing it. But it takes time. OIRA’s review lasted not for 90 or 120, but for 200 days. When
recently EPA finally published its draft, giving [only] a 90-day window for public comment, the

16
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draft had taken a milder form. It presented as a possible alternative treating the ash as a much
more ordinary waste product under another subtitle (D) of RCRA; use of subtitle D would entail
considerably less federal supervision.
Consistently with the order’s transparency undertakings, EPA immediately posted to its
website both the draft it had submitted,19 and a document showing the revisions it had made
during the OIRA process.20 Initially, it also posted interagency comments received from other
government bodies during OIRA’s processing of the draft,21 although these were withdrawn from
the governmental database to which they had been posted almost as soon as their presence had
been reported.22 The immediate result has been political; and one imagines, too, that the publicity
strengthens the EPA’s capacity to exercise its own judgment, and that such revelations could be
damaging on judicial review , as well, should it choose the weaker alternative.
A similar event had occurred late in the Bush administration. In the spring of 2008, the
public became aware of disagreements between the White House and the Environmental
Protection Administration [EPA] about the level of ozone exposure appropriate for national
ambient air quality standards to protect forest growth and other “secondary” targets of protection
from harm by air pollution.23 (“Primary” standards are set for public health concerns.) Reflecting
the differences they understood between the needs and vulnerabilities of human and forest lungs,
the various scientific advisory committees and bureaucratic decisionmakers within EPA had
settled on an ozone level marginally differing from the primary standard. It would have been
somewhat more stringent than the primary level but also with a more forgiving measurement
interval.
These standards are to be set following the public procedures of the Clean Air Act for
rulemaking, procedures building on but somewhat more stringent than those of our
Administrative Procedure Act. The EPA’s Administrator, by statute given the authority to decide
such matters, was prepared to accept and act on the advice he had received from his staff. OIRA
initially sought reconsideration of this conclusion, suggesting that the primary and secondary
standards would most efficiently be identical – set at the somewhat more permissive level already
determined for the primary standard. EPA staff generated a response detailing why, in their
judgment, the best scientific evidence available about the differing vulnerabilities of humans and
forests required differing standards under their statutory responsibilities,. The EPA

19

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480ae5de2
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Administrator indicated to the White House, then, that he intended to stand by his staff’s
judgment. At this point he was directed – told President Bush had decided – that identical
standards must be adopted. The Administrator acquiesced.
The resulting blizzard of newspaper stories and congressional inquiries suggested that
something untoward had occurred. The relevant statute, placing the responsibility for this
decision in the Administrator and not the President, both assumed and required that the decision
would be made in accordance with the best available scientific information. Neither the
President nor his agent OIRA has the resources or expertise to do good science on such an issue.
Moreover, the relevant statute precludes using economic cost/benefit, as such, as a decisional
consideration. (While this proposition might seem questionable as a policy matter, it had
underlain our Supreme Court’s willingness just a few years earlier to accept the significant lawmaking authority the statute confers on the EPA’s Administrator.24 Permitting EPA to make
political trade-offs rather than base its actions on ostensibly objective judgments about best
science would heighten concerns about the constitutionality of conferring this law-making
authority on unelected officials.25) Suspicions were rife that the White House judgment about
ozone was animated by raw political concerns for the well-being of favored industries; or if not
that, certainly by the factors of economic cost that the statutes had excluded from the
Administrator’s consideration. Congressional committees demanded, and the Bush White House
adamantly refused to provide, a variety of documentary evidence and testimony on the issue. The
standard was issued in the form the White House had insisted upon, and in that form could have
been subject to judicial review.26
That the back-and-forth became public is again due in substantial part to the increasing
availability of information about governmental regulatory activities on the Internet. The EPA
has been one of the leading agencies in developing public Internet data-bases associated with its
rulemaking activities. As a matter of the APA’s text, the obligations to expose matters concerned
with rulemaking appear to be rather slight. Nonetheless, judicial decisions and the realities of
our Freedom of Information Act have resulted in thorough agency exposure of the scientific
reports or data on which rulemaking decisions may be based, as well as commentary received
from outside the agency. The idea that this should happen is uncontroversial, and is strongly
voiced in one of President Obama’s early executive orders. To the extent such information is
made available and searchable on the Internet, as increasingly it is, citizen monitoring is
facilitated. And, responding in part to commitments made in the OIRA mandate, the

24

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“W hile Congress need not provide
any direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define ‘country grain elevators,’ which are to be
exempt from [certain statutory requirements], it must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect
the entire national economy.”).
25

Cf. Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y. 2d 1 (1987) (New York’s Public Health Council authorized to consider only
public health factors in adopting a regulation controlling smoking in public places; it lacks the “open-ended
discretion” to construct “a regulatory scheme laden with exceptions based solely upon economic and social
concerns.”)
26

On September 16, 2009, the EPA Administrator, now in the Obama administration, announced that she was
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computerized database for the ozone rulemaking quickly included much material revealing the
back-and-forth that had occurred. Perhaps a knowledgeable EPA official then suggested to the
reporter that he have a look.
What one can take from both of these episodes, it is submitted, as from the bureaucratic
regime within which they arose, is that neither within the agencies, nor in the larger political
world, is it taken as given that the President gets to decide the issues committed to agency
responsibility, and that the White House nonetheless (and understandably) works to bend their
outputs to its preferences. They suggest important means by which recent Presidents have used
White House bureaucracies in shaping their government’s complex behavior.
POLITICIZATION OF THE AGENCIES
An alternative route to control, to which American administrative law scholars are turning
increasing attention, is through increasing the proportion of agency staff who are subject to
political appointment.27 Like European nations, with the emergence of a bureaucracy and
regulatory government dependent on law-constrained behavior for its legitimacy, the United
States created a civil service system in the late 19th century. While it might initially have been
thought a regime just for clerks and similarly powerless employees,28 Congress also applied it
to powerful bureau chiefs.29 Thus, it embraced professional positions often exercising
considerable responsibility as well as clerks and other functionaries, in a framework of merit
selection and protected tenure.
With the creation of a “Senior Executive Service” during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter,
the more powerful civil service positions – those in the upper reaches of the statutory
compensation hierarchy – were made subject to management controls such as the possibilities
of bonuses or reassignment, that were thought important to improve the efficiency of the Service.
Of course, these changes also had the effect of considerably increasing the effective power of the
political leadership of agencies over their most important staff. Apart from this change, the
number of “political” positions in administration controlled by the White House, wholly outside
the Civil Service and not requiring Senate confirmation, increased, and now exceeds 2,500.
(The Senate-confirmed positions corresponding to ministerial positions in parliamentary systems
are much less numerous, and notoriously slow to be filled.)30 Persons living in parliamentary
systems built over permanent civil service bodies will find this level of politicality astounding.
Again, one can see these changes as an understandable political response to the difficulties
of dealing with a more-or-less permanent and protected bureaucracy. This is particularly true for
Republican Presidents, at least when (as recently) their general program has been to “get the
government off the backs” of those it regulates. People with permanent jobs in government often

27

See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency
Politicization, 76 G EO . W ASH . L. R EV . 1095, 1123-25 (2008),
28

United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
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Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs (1983). Creation of the Senior
Executive Service in President Carter’s administration somewhat ameliorated the resulting tensions.
30

Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: D elays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.Cal.L.Rev. 913
(2009) and W aiting for Leadership, Center for American Progress Report, April 2010, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1607263 (Visited June 30, 2010).
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choose them in order to satisfy preferences that see government as a “good.” The Washington,
D.C. metropolitan area is well known to be the most heavily Democrat constituency in the
country – perhaps reflecting these commitments among its largest work force, which it the civil
service. Political penetration of the agencies will appear an effective means of securing control
of their behavior, on behalf of a President who is the country’s only elected executive official.
A particularly dramatic and perhaps revealing form of this development took place late in the
Bush administration, almost immediately following the opening of a Congress that, for the first
time in his administration, was not controlled by his own political party. EO 12,866 had long
required the agency head personally to approve the annual regulatory plan, and agencies to
designate “regulatory policy officers” as subordinate officials, reporting to the agency head, with
responsibility to oversee the regulatory analysis process. Now Executive Order 13,422 (1) put
this officer (not the agency head) in charge of the annual regulatory plan, (2) forbade the
initiation of any rulemaking without his approval (unless the head specifically intervened), (3)
removed the language that made him responsible to the agency head, and (4) provided that he
must be a presidential appointee – that is, a person whose appointment might not need to be
confirmed by the Senate, and whose tenure in office the President could directly control. The
RPO would now be a White House gatekeeper far less visible than the agency’s head and without
his possible commitments to the Senate; she would be someone who could see to it that the
President’s preferences were enforced.
President Obama early rescinded these amendments, but the numerosity of political
appointees generally remains, in sharp contrast to what one expects of parliamentary systems.
SECURING A PLACE FOR “THE RULE OF LAW ” IN ADMINISTRATION
Of course one cannot – should not – expect to separate politics from administration. “A
government of laws and not of men” could be effected only in a robot state. The issue is
maintaining a balance in which law has a significant role as a constraint on politics. One could
think that the separation of responsibility for ordinary administration from the White House,
under judicial as well as presidential (and congressional) oversight, is a means by which this
might be achieved.
The tension between law and politics lives in the centerpiece of American constitutional
development, Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison.31 In passages less often
the occasion for focus in American law school classrooms than its famous defense of
constitutional review, Chief Justice Marshall asserted the sufficiency of political will, rather than
judicially assessed judgment, for those matters committed to the President’s discretion:
The Secretary of State, in administering foreign affairs] is to conform precisely to the will
of the President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of
such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.
...
. . . [W]here the heads of departments are . . . to act in cases in which the executive
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear, than
that their acts are only politically examinable. . . . The province of the courts is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive
31

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137(1803).
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officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never
be made in this court.32
Yet when administrative agencies exercise “discretion” in the form of executive agency
rulemaking, judicial review of its reasonableness is the very coin of its legitimacy.33
The Court has squared this circle by characterizing the activities Chief Justice Marshall is
invoking – the conduct of military or foreign affairs – as the realm of unreviewable
DISCRETION!!! those settings in which there is “no law to apply.”34 Where the law does set
standards—as it must where agencies are authorized to act with the force of law—one finds,
rather, “discretion,” a setting in which judicial review of its exercise is de rigeur. While courts
must abjure substituting their judgment for the agency’s, yet nonetheless they are to engage in
“searching and careful,” if “narrow,” review.35 Seeking to assure the exercise of judgment, not
simply political will, reviewing courts assess the adequacy of those judgments by inquiries quite
severe in their demands for rationality.36 And for more than three decades, some have celebrated
this development as a means for giving “those who care about well-documented and wellreasoned decision-making a lever with which to move those who do not.”37
Consider, in this respect, the Supreme Court’s famous decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 Cited more often than any other recent administrative
law decision, the unanimous opinion in Chevron is at pains to celebrate the fact of presidential
oversight as support for its conclusion that once a reviewing court has found that an agency’s
statutory interpretation falls within the possible meanings of the language empowering it – that
the statute could mean what the agency has concluded it does mean – then the court’s function
is reduced to reviewing that conclusion for reasonableness in the conventional way. Some might
take this reasoning as an endorsement of presidential control. But note that this “Chevron
deference,” as it is called, is limited to an agency’s interpretations of statutes for which the
agency itself has particular responsibility. If the agency is interpreting a statute of broader
application for which it has no special responsibility – the federal Administrative Procedure Act,
for example – no such respect is owing to its view. Now suppose the President has a view what
the statute means – is that view entitled to Chevron deference? – perhaps especially so, since he
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is after all the President? The argument has been made, by Justice-to-be Kagan when she was
a Harvard law professor.39 The contrary view, mine, is that Congress has not given the President
particular responsibility for this statute; that, it has assigned to the agency – and that assignment
is one element of the law to whose faithful execution the President is constitutionally required
to see. To admit the President’s view to the same degree of deference, in my judgment, is to
confer on him broad authority for the interpretation of all law – a step our courts have never
indicated they are willing to take (and properly so, in this writer’s opinion).
Thus, a court that suspects Presidential involvement in a decision, rather than finding in this
a reason for ready acceptance of the agency’s outcome, may work especially hard to see that the
outcome can be justified in terms of the materials publicly on the agency’s plate. Judge Patricia
Wald’s canonical decision in Sierra Club v. Costle spends 103 pages closely attending to the
EPA’s reasoning supporting its early rule requiring scrubbing and other measures to control
sulphur dioxide emissions by electric power plants, before reaching (and putting aside) the
possibility that unrecorded presidential and congressional counseling might have influenced the
EPA Administrator in choosing among the several possibilities the record would support.40 This
rigorous analysis makes clear that she was reviewing the EPA Administrator’s decision and
doing so with intensity:
We reach our decision after interminable record searching (and considerable soul
searching). We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably
give its thousands of pages.540 ... We cannot redo the agency’s job ... . So in the end we
can only make our best effort to understand, to see if the result makes sense, and to assure
that nothing unlawful or irrational has taken place. In this case, we have taken a long
while to come to a short conclusion: the rule is reasonable.41
Whatever the conversation with the President may have been, Judge Wald understood that the
decision was the administrator’s – not the President’s – and one to be closely reviewed following
the administrator’s reasons. Every judicial review opinion I am aware of reflects the same
premise.
STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS AND THE PCAOB42
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board case raised the final question to be treated
here – to what extent Congress must honor the President’s necessary relations to a governmental
body responsible for law-execution in creating governmental structures. An essentially
unanimous Congress, with President Bush’s strong support, created the PCAOB, under the aegis
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of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in an effort to replace deficient accounting industry
self-regulation with effective external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered
passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential authority and separation of
powers, that divided the D.C. Circuit 2-1.43 The dissenting opinion there hinted, and some
commentators appear to have hoped, that the Court’s decision would endorse the position that
the President, vested with “the executive power,” must have at least that degree of authority over
agency action as would permit him to remove any government official exercising executive
authority for any reason, free of “for cause” restrictions. But the majority opinion of the closely
divided Court expressed no reservations about Congress’s authority to create a single level of
“for cause” protection – as it found was enjoyed by the Commissioners of the SEC. The only
difficulty it found was that Congress had given PCAOB members’ similarly protected tenure,
with the question of “cause” for their removal to be decided not by the President but by the
Commissioners. Finding that provision constitutionally objectionable, it preserved both what it
understood as the President’s necessary capacity to oversee the faithful execution of the laws, and
every element of the PCAOB’s affirmative authority over the accounting profession.
Congress’s choices in creating the PCAOB may suggest both the wide variety of government
institutions it has established, and the difficulties involved in measuring them against the
Constitution’s limited provisions. Neither any party nor any Justice doubted that the PCAOB
must be considered a “government entity” in assessing any constitutional constraints imposed
by separation of powers considerations. Yet in many respects – and not only those that excited
this litigation – it is an odd duck. Its five members each earn a salary considerably higher than
is paid to any person we might usually think a government official, including our President.44
Its employees are free of the salary restrictions and other characteristics of the civil service
system. The expense of maintaining them, and the PCAOB’s program generally, is met not by
the congressionally enacted appropriations our Constitution calls for to justify the spending of
public moneys, but from fees collected from both the accounting industry it is responsible to
regulate and the public companies they audit, in accordance with a budget approved not by
Congress but by the SEC. If concededly a “government entity,” the PCAOB is not a
“government agency,” with the result that its activities are not subject to, and made judicially
reviewable by, the federal Administrative Procedure Act. It is useful to realize that in some or
all of these respects, respects that were not prominent in the litigation, it is not alone. The Postal
Service, the Federal Reserve and its member institutions, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and
the Bonneville Power Authority are among the mixed-character “government entities” Congress
has created over the years.
In certain respects, too, the PCAOB resembles quasi-public institutions like the stock
exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, that since 193845 have regulated
investment activities in the shadow of the SEC. These institutions regulate professional actvities
and discipline members for violations of the SEC’s or the organization's rules, in the interest of
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promoting self-regulation, but subject to the plenary supervision of the SEC.46 Over the years,
this relationship has been expanded47 “to ensure that there is no gap between self-regulatory
performance and regulatory need.”48 The activities of these organizations are diverse and their
expertise substantial, supplying disciplinary resources the federal government could not easily
afford.49 Operating under SEC review, they control their officers and budget, and adopt their
own rules of discipline and practice (albeit subject to standards the SEC will enforce on its
review of individual disciplinary proceedings).
Congress, then, was building on reasonably familiar models in creating the PCAOB. Yet in
the interests of both closer SEC control and avoidance of self-interested self-regulation, it placed
the PCAOB much more tightly under SEC control. Its budgets and the fees that support them
must be approved by the Commission. The rules it enforces are subject to Commission approval
and displacement. Its leadership is appointed by the Commission to fixed terms of office, which
can be terminated prematurely by the Commission only on a finding of “cause” on one of three
specified grounds, two of which require “willful” misconduct in office.
Just these differences, compounded by the role of the SEC, fueled the constitutional
controversy. The SEC itself, as an independent regulatory commission, has only a limited
relationship with the President. Its Commissioners, too, serve fixed terms and may be removed
by him only “for cause.” The President’s capacity to oversee the policymaking of independent
regulatory commissions like the SEC is, at best, untested. If Congress in creating the PCAOB
made it, unlike the New York Stock Exchange, the NASD, FINRA – or for that matter the
American Bar Association, lawyers’ SRO – so close to the SEC as to have become “a
government entity,” did it fail to recognize the President’s constitutionally required place in
American government?
A Brief Look at the Limits on Congress’s Structural Choices
Congress unquestionably has the legislative responsibility to create the institutions of
American government. Its choices in creating the structures of government over the years have
been highly varied, as particular problems appear to call for particular approaches, and they have
often answered to its appreciation of the need for institutional distance from raw politics. Yet
there is also the risk that they embody an impermissible preference to substitute its own
supervision of “faithful execution” for the President’s. Assessing that risk – protecting the
President’s exclusive and unconditional responsibility to oversee the faithful execution of the
laws it enacts – characterizes American separation of powers jurisprudence, and was accepted
by all the Justices in the PCAOB case as their responsibility. The dispute between majority and
dissent lay in that risk assessment, and its relation to the Constitution’s text and the existing,
46
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well-established framework of laws structuring the President’s relationship to the bureaucracy.
Few such issues have come to the Supreme Court, and few of Congress’s choices have been
disapproved. A few principles safeguarding against congressional aggrandizement of its own
role are clearly established: Congress cannot confer on itself a function in appointment to50 or
removal from51 executive office beyond senatorial confirmation and impeachment. Nor may it
create mechanisms for disapproving executive action other than by enacting statutes or
withholding appropriations.52
What Congress is authorized to do in regulating the President’s relationships with the
agencies it creates, rather than its own, is much less clear. The leading cases often reason in ways
not readily connected to their underlying facts. In 1926, for example, a closely divided Court
decided Myers v. United States with great difficulty (the case had to be argued twice, and the
opinions in it were lengthy), finding unconstitutional a statutory constraint on the removal of city
postmasters. The case is written as if, and is often said to have held that, with the exception of
civil service members and officers whose role is the adjudication of contested matters, the
President must have an unfettered right to remove executive officers at will. Yet the restraint it
found unconstitutional was a congressional effort to require senatorial approval of the removal
of the postmaster (an executive official) from office – that is to say, the Senate’s participation in
the President’s executive action.53 Not a decade later, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,
the Court unanimously and peremptorily held that Congress could make an FTC Commissioner’s
five-year term of office safe from earlier presidential termination unless “for cause.” Here
Congress had not attempted to preserve its own participation in the removal decision, but that
was not the basis for distinguishing Myers. Rather, the Court pretended that the FTC performed
no significant “executive” function.54 This rationale’s apparently complete removal of the
Commission from the executive branch gave birth to decades of concern about a “headless fourth
branch.” No one today doubts – all nine Justices in the PCAOB case agreed – that the SEC and
other independent regulatory commissions are elements of the executive branch, having to have
an oversight relationship with the President, simply a less powerful one than may exist with
executive agencies whose heads do not enjoy protected tenure.
Where Congress has placed appointment power in the President alone, the courts, or the head
of a department, it has generally been found free to specify the terms on which the office will be
held, including removal protections. It was largely on this basis that the civil service was
sustained. But this gives importance to the question who is an “inferior officer,” for whom
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Congress can make such a judgment. And, until the PCAOB case, the Court had never
confronted the question whether “for cause” protection could be afforded to an “inferior officer”
if the Department head who appointed and might remove her was itself protected from removal
except “for cause.”
Three cases, two problematic and the third somewhat enigmatic, addressed this question. In
Morrison v. Olsen,55 half a century after Humphrey’s Executor, seven of eight Justices approved
Congress’s post-Watergate creation of the Office of Independent Counsel – an official
responsible for investigating and possibly prosecuting high executive officials suspected of
crime, even the President, after appointment by a special judicial panel, and under only limited
supervision by the Attorney General. No one could or did pretend that the independent counsel
performed no significant executive function; the majority, rather, concluded that the possibility
of the Attorney General’s removing him “for cause,” and his obligation ordinarily to be governed
by general Department of Justice policies, made him an “inferior officer” with a constitutionally
sufficient relationship to the President – a totality-of-the-circumstances conclusion with which
the lone dissenter, Justice Scalia, violently disagreed. Neither majority nor dissent in the
PCAOB case raised any question about the continuing validity of these opinions.
In 1991, Freytag v. Commission of Internal Revenue56 appeared to raise a significant question
whether independent regulatory commissions could constitutionally be authorized to appoint
“inferior officers,” as of course they regularly were. The case put before the Court the
appointment of a relatively minor quasi-judicial official of the Tax Court (a body established by
Congress under Article I and not an Article III court), who because he exercised decisional
authority was nonetheless an “inferior officer.” Justice Blackmun, for a bare majority, invoked
an essentially originalist theme: given the Framers’ apprehensions about “the most insidious and
powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism,” the “heads of departments” Congress could
authorize to make appointments must be the heads of Cabinet-level departments, “limited in
number and easily identified. Their heads are subject to political oversight and share the
President’s accountability to the people.”
What, then, about people like the General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(a position to which I had earlier been appointed by that Commission)? The General Counsel,
essentially independent in his responsibility for litigating on behalf of the Commission and giving
commissioners legal advice, is clearly an “inferior officer,” and just as clearly the NRC is not one
of those Cabinet-level departments, “limited in number and easily identified.” Having announced
its rationale (which the official in question in Freytag escaped because the majority somehow
associated his appointment with the “Courts of Law”), the Court appended a footnote as curious
and muddling as had been the Court’s decades-earlier denial in Humphrey’s Executor that the
FTC exercised executive branch functions:57 “We do not address here any question involving an
appointment of an inferior officer by the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the
Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission ... and the Federal Reserve

55

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

56

501 U.S. 868 (1991).

57

Note 54 above.

16

Bank of St. Louis.”58 If one believes this footnote, what has become of the text’s historygrounded insistence on the necessity of limitations on number, and on “heads of Departments”
who share the President’s accountability to the people?
Justice Scalia (who has been heard by your author to describe Freytag as the single worst
opinion of his incumbency) concurred for four, rejecting the majority’s “Courts of Law”
rationale, and simply taking the constitutionality of the FTC in particular, and the great variety
of federal agencies in general, to have become established. History had to be taken to trump
originalism in this case; given all the congressional water that had been permitted to flow under
the bridge, return to the text would simply be too disruptive.59 Perhaps it will not be surprising
to learn that Justice Scalia’s opinion, for four only, was taken by all the PCAOB parties to
represent what Freytag stands for, and that the Court’s opinions unanimously endorsed this
position.
“Inferior officer” issues became somewhat clearer with Edmond v. United States,60 which
permitted the Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard’s Court
of Criminal Appeals. Now Justice Scalia wrote, for all but Justice Souter, that “in the context
of a clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important government
assignments, we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate.” There is a tension in this formulation, however. Freytag’s
originalist theme, and so perhaps its apparent limits on congressional delegation to department
heads of the appointment power, is preserved by “in the context of a clause designed to preserve
political accountability relative to important government assignments.” On the other hand, that
theme does not so clearly live in “directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”
The PCAOB decision
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These cases, in very brief compass, set the backdrop against which the PCAOB case was
argued and deciding. Drawing on the first phrase in Edmonds, for example, petitioners strongly
argued, as did some commentators, that the importance of the PCAOB’s responsibilities required
that its members be regarded as “principal officers” of the United States, whose appointment
must, therefore, be made by presidential nomination and senatorial consent. Not a Justice found
merit in that contention. They were unanimous that the SEC’s considerable authority over their
actions rendered them “inferior officers” within the Edmonds formulation. As the SEC is a
constitutional “department” for appointments clause purposes, then, Freytag notwithstanding,
it could constitutionally be given the power of appointing inferior officers, including for these
purposes the members of the PCAOB.61
As to the question of removal, however, the majority found that the “preservation of political
accountability” – that is, preservation of the effectiveness of the President’s constitutional
position at the head of executive government – precluded protecting the tenure of PCAOB
members by the provision for “for cause” removal. The members of the SEC, it asserted, were
themselves protected from removal from office except “for cause.” To say that they were in
charge of removing Board members, but themselves could do so only if stringent “for cause”
provisions were satisfied – to permit Congress to create one “independent” authority within
another – would be to allow the delegation of important executive “duties” to officials beyond
the President’s effective ability to oversee their conduct of office.
This conclusion did not, however, imperil the general statutory scheme. The majority found
that this flaw in the statute could easily be cured by severing the offensive “for cause” removal
provisions from the statute, leaving the PCAOB’s affirmative responsibilities and authority
unimpaired. It is simply that its members would now perform their functions under the same
possibility of discipline as direct SEC employees face, leaving “the President separated from
Board members by only a single level of good-cause tenure. The Commission is then fully
61
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responsible for the Board’s actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own actions
to Presidential oversight.”62
Because it is so accepting of a single level of “for cause” protection, the result is unlikely to
satisfy those who take the strongest view of presidential authority – that our President must be
able to discipline any executive officer, and command their performance of discretionary duty
along the lines that he prefers. For them, even a single level of “for cause” protection should be
found impermissible. They had hoped that the Court would reach back to undo the mischief they
believe had been done to that view when in Humphrey’s Executor a unanimous Court permitted
Congress to establish agencies whose heads could be removed only “for cause.”63 No Justice
suggested such a view. Strikingly, every reference in the majority opinion to the President’s
constitutional authority invoked his necessary prerogative to oversee, not to decide, the actions
of executive departments.
The flaw in the argument of the strong presidentialists, to be brief about it, is that they stop
reading Article II after its first sentence. But it goes on. While it describes the President as
“Commander in Chief” of the military – no question here, he is entitled to issue orders that are
to be unquestioningly obeyed – all it says about his relationship to domestic authorities once
appointed is that he is entitled to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each
of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”
This power, which as holder of “the executive power” it seems he must have over the SEC as
well as the EPA,64 stands in sharp contrast to being “Commander in Chief.” The agencies have
the duties; he gets to reason with them, as he strives to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. And for him to ignore those placements of “Duties” in others would in itself be to fail
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Again, the question is not whether he is
entitled to command or decide, but what constitute the constitutionally indispensable elements
of his necessary oversight relationship.
Justice Breyer’s strident dissent for the (relatively) liberal wing of the Court suggested two
problems with the majority’s “single level” limitation. First, it is not at all clear that it is violated
by the “for cause” protection of PCAOB members; the SEC statute, quite deliberately at the time
of its enactment, did not provide “for cause” protection to the members of the SEC. Second, if
one looks past the PCAOB to the enormous variety of statutory provisions respecting government
employment, one easily finds hundreds if not thousands of government employees who can only
removed “for cause” by superiors who themselves can only be removed “for cause.” The
majority deals with the first problem by bold assertion, and with the second – reminiscent of the
Freytag footnote that produced the effective overruling of that case in this one65 – by leaving
such questions to another day.
The majority’s handling of the first of these issues is quite astonishing, particularly coming
from conservative Justices who repeatedly assert that it is for Congress, not the courts, to make
law, that the courts are obliged to take statutes as Congress has written them. Justice Breyer
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observed in his dissent that the SEC statute had been written after the decision in the Myers case
(recall that the conventional reading of Myers was that it recognized as a matter of constitutional
necessity an unfettered presidential right to remove executive officers66), but before Myers’
qualification by Humphrey’s Executor.67 Congress had enacted the FTC’s “for cause” provision
before Myers. Now it omitted a similar provision from the SEC statute out of fear that if that
provision was found unconstitutional, the result would be to jeopardize the whole scheme.
Unwilling to take that risk, its members perhaps understood that presidential interference with
such a commission would generate enough political heat to dissuade any President from
dismissing a commissioner without an articulable, apolitical reason.68 Would it be proper for a
court to insert a protection of tenure that the legislature did not enact, even inadvertently? The
opinion in Myers suggested the possibility of limits to the President’s removal power for officials
serving as adjudicators; – and this reservation has been picked up in subsequent cases.69 But the
Myers opinion, the Court’s general jurisprudence before and after it, and the ready implication
of the President’s constitutional duty to assure the faithful execution of the laws, all establish
rather clearly that the default position is that the President may remove any Department head, and
Department heads may remove any officers inferior to them, at will. It took a statute to create
the civil service system; congressional practice is to specify those higher offices from which
incumbents may be removed only “for cause.” Since there is no such statute for the SEC
Commissioners, even though custom and political realities doubtless support such a constraint,
one would think that as a matter of law SEC commissioners must serve at the President’s
pleasure. And, if so, the two-level proposition on which the majority opinion turns is irrelevant,
because only PCAOB Members are protected from removal unless “for cause.”
The majority’s entire discussion of the point, in response to Justice Breyer’s argument?
The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President
except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” 295 U. S., at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief for
Petitioners 31; Brief for United States 43; Brief for Respondent Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board 31 (hereinafter PCAOB Brief); Tr. of Oral Arg. 47, and we
decide the case with that understanding.
That is, the majority decided a question of law, on which their holding that the PCAOB “for
cause”“ removal provision was unconstitutional depended, by bare assertion – relying on party
choices how to argue the case. A brief filed amicus curiae, not mentioned by the majority, had
informed the Court of the problem. The failure of any party to argue it, as Professor Richard
Pierce has remarked, can be ascribed to self-interested motives of a kind that usually are taken
as a signal of improper litigation about constitutionality.
The petitioners did not want to take the position that the SEC statute authorizes at will
removal because that would undermine their argument about dual insulation from
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presidential control. The SEC did not want to take that position because it wanted to
preserve the option of making an argument ... that the structure of the statute suggests a
congressional intent to insulate the Commissioners from at will removal. ... I have it on
good authority that PCAOB wanted to make that argument but that SEC overrruled it.
That alone suggests that SEC could control PCAOB even before the majority eliminated
the limits on the SEC's power to remove Board members.70
As Professor Funk remarked on the same informal internet forum, that we both participate in,
“To decide the constitutionality of a statutory provision based upon an ‘understanding’ agreed
to by the parties as to the meaning of another relevant statutory provision ... is, I believe, as
unique as the PCAOB itself.”71
If one turns to the merits of the two-level proposition, one can find a certain tension in the
majority opinion, one element of which forcefully animates Justice Breyer’s dissent. At places,
the majority appears to be objecting to Congress’s creation of a “for cause”-protected institution
(the PCAOB) within another “for cause”-protected institution (the SEC). In this respect, the
PCAOB is, to the author’s knowledge, virtually unique. The other such institutions of which the
author is aware, for example the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, have only adjudicatory responsibilities. While their actions are
nominally to be regarded as executive actions, because they occur in an element of the executive
branch in which they reside, nonetheless these “quasi-adjudicatory” actions fall within the
reservation noted in Myers and drawn on in later cases,72 that presidential oversight of
adjudicatory functions is properly limited in the interest of their quasi-judicial character and
attendant considerations of fairness. The PCAOB, on the other hand, is not a committed
adjudicator. It has the same full range of responsibilities other government agencies commonly
possess – rulemaking and enforcement in addition to adjudication. For an entity operated over
that full range the argument for presidential oversight is considerably stronger. Had the majority
clearly held only that Congress could not constitutionally create one fully-functioned, “for
cause”-protected agency within another such agency, there would have been little to write about.
It is hard to imagine such a conclusion doing much mischief.73
In some of its discussion, the majority embraces such a limitation, viz.:
The only issue in this case is whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate
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control over the Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy. We hold that it cannot.74
Yet in other passages, the majority’s reasoning appears to be about the removability vel non
of individual PCAOB members as “inferior officers,” evoking the Edmonds test. For example,
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion asserts
we have previously upheld limited restrictions on the President’s removal power. In
those cases, however, only one level of protected tenure separated the President from an
officer exercising executive power. It was the President – or a subordinate he could
remove at will – who decided whether the officer’s conduct merited removal under the
good-cause standard.75
If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why not
a third? 76
In responding to the dissent’s elaboration of the thousands of government officials who meet
Edmonds’ “inferior officer” test, the majority does not say that it is dealing with the status of an
institution, but rather responds as if those cases are to be resolved on other grounds, grounds
consistent with a standard governing individual “officers” like each of the Board’s members,
rather than institutions like the PCAOB.
... [M]any civil servants within independent agencies would not qualify as “Officers
of the United States,” who “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States,” Buckley, 424 U. S. [1], at 126.9 ... We do not decide the status of other
Government employees, nor do we decide whether “lesser functionaries subordinate to
officers of the United States” must be subject to the same sort of control as those who
exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws.” Buckley , supra, at 126, and n. 162.
Nor do the employees referenced by the dissent enjoy the same significant and
unusual protections from Presidential oversight as members of the Board. ... [M]embers
of the Senior Executive Service may be reassigned or reviewed by agency heads . ...
Nothing in our opinion ... should be read to cast doubt on the use of what is colloquially
known as the civil service system within independent agencies.10
Finally, the dissent wanders far afield when it suggests that today’s opinion might
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increase the President’s authority to remove military officers. ... The President and his
subordinates may ... convene boards of inquiry or courts-martial to hear claims of
misconduct or poor performance by those officers. ... Here, by contrast, the President has
no authority to initiate a Board member’s removal for cause.
Perhaps the citation to Buckley is indeed a signal that the majority holding is limited to the
heads of discrete institutions. That case involved an Appointments Clause challenge to the
members of the Federal Election Commission, a freestanding body lacking any such relationship
as the PCAOB has with the SEC. At the place Chief Justice Roberts referred to one finds this
text and footnote:
If "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be
established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other
of these modes of appointment," United States v. Germaine, supra, it is difficult to see
how the members of the Commission may escape inclusion. If a Postmaster first class,
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte
Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (1839), are inferior officers of the United States within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause, as they are, surely the Commissioners before us are at the
very least such "inferior Officers" within the meaning of that Clause.162
162

"Officers of the United States" does not include all employees of the United States, but there is
no claim made that the Commissioners are employees of the United States rather than officers.
Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States, see Auffmordt v.
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, supra, whereas the
Commissioners, appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to the control or direction of any
other executive, judicial, or legislative authority. (Emphasis added).

Saying only that the FEC Commissioners were “at the very least ... ‘inferior Officers’” perhaps
reflected a compromise needed to secure an opinion “for the Court” in Buckley; as it is, the
majority opinion stretches well over 100 pages in US Reports. Nonetheless, the failure to agree
that Officers “not subject to the control or direction of any other executive, judicial, or legislative
authority” are, indeed, principal officers, who must be appointed with the Senate’s advice and
consent, is remarkable. One supposes, indeed, that, like the Commissioners of the SEC, FEC
Commissioners must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and
that their actions are executive actions, with the necessary continuing role of presidential
oversight the PCAOB majority insists that conclusion entails.
As noted above, one of the petitioners’ major arguments had been that the members of the
PCAOB must be regarded as principal officers and, given the SEC’s strong “control or
direction”over their actions, that argument did not attract a single vote.75 Whatever may be the
case for FEC Commissioners, the members of the PCAOB, fitting the Edmonds formula, are
“inferior officers.” On the other hand, they do head a discrete body with a full range of
administrative responsibilities and a distinct legal personality. What is curious, then, is that the
PCAOB majority did not make explicit that this institutional character was an element of its
reasoning, limiting its holding to the heads of discrete institutions. Rather, it seems to have
indicated that it would treat the “inferior officer” question case by case.
This is what makes the Buckley signal ambiguous. If, as in Freytag, a minor quasi-judicial
actor is an “officer of the United States,” or if, as in Edmonds, a Coast Guard officer is, then the
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implications of denying the possibility of two-level “for cause” protection at the level of the
individual rather than the institution are enormous, as Justice Breyer’s dissent principally argues.
The majority’s failure to be explicit about this is regrettable; its promise to take the matter up
case by case is what recalls the tensions created by the Freytag footnote.
Justice Breyer, exploiting this seemingly intentional irresolution in the majority opinion,
details at length the variety of government officials who meet the Edmonds test. Persons
appointed to leadership positions in independent agencies, and removable by their agency head
only “for cause” enjoy the same two levels of “for cause” protection as the members of the
PCAOB. When the majority reasons that by striking the “for cause” protection of PCAOB
members it renders them subject to the same level of presidential control as any inferior officer
of the SEC, it elides the possibility that some of those inferior officers – for example, its
Inspector General76 or its Administrative Law Judges – are themselves removable only for cause,
by an agency itself enjoying “for cause” protection. The members of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration are protected by “for
cause” removal restrictions; and, as Justice Breyer details, so are a great many of the officials
who head their various bureaus and subdivisions. It might suffice to say – but this is what the
majority surprisingly did not say – that those bureaus and subdivisions are merely parts of the
larger agency, lacking the full range of administrative powers or a separate legal personality. But
it does not suffice to say that if they are members of the Senior Executive Service [SES], they
“may be reassigned or reviewed by agency heads.” Not all of them are members of the SES –
the NRC’s chief officers, for example – and all of them do have quite a significant level of
authority, easily meeting the Edmonds test.77 Nor is the power of reassignment and review in the
SES the equivalent of removal.
The uncertainties seemingly cultivated by the majority opinion illustrate just how hard it is
to accommodate the governmental structures Congress has created for the Twenty-First Century
to a Constitution created in the Eighteenth. Freytag had seemed to doom independent agencies’
powers of appointment with its impeccable originalist reasoning about the necessity strictly to
limit the dispersal of appointment powers to a handful of cabinet-level bodies. After Freytag,
as General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, appointed by the Commission, I had
to wonder if my commission had been legally valid. With one hand the PCAOB majority has
lifted that shadow – what is a “Department” whose head[s] must be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate (and who may then themselves be vested with the
power to appoint inferior officers) cannot be limited in the way Freytag seemed to say. But the
NRC General Counsel’s office is one that appears in Justice Breyer’s extensive appendices; the
General Counsel is not a member of the Senior Executive Service; and his authorities to represent
the Commission, to write and file its briefs, etc., clearly mark him as an “inferior officer.” With
its other hand, the majority may have said that the NRC’s General Counsel – or the SEC’s
Inspector General – may not serve under the protection of “for cause” removal. As in Freytag,
only the promise of decision case-by-case in the future – not the sort of promise one would
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ordinarily expect to be acceptable to the conservative side of the Court’s bench78 – preserves the
possibility of that protection’s survival.
The underlying issue, as both opinions recognize, is finding a way of accommodating the
prolixity of government structures Congress creates without teaching Congress how to avoid the
President’s constitutionally necessary role as our unitary executive. If Congress, knowing it
cannot itself appoint to executive office, could find the means to vest that power in a person or
body that was itself independent of presidential oversight, that line would have been crossed.
A Testing Future Case? The Copyright Royalty Tribunal
Issues like this are likely continually to recur, and sometimes in contexts that will not be so
easily remedied. Consider the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, a body of three federal officials
responsible for setting royalty rates for digitally distributed music. In SoundExchange v.
Librarian of Congress,79 Judge Kavanaugh (whose articulate dissent in PCAOB helped catalyze
the grant of certiorari), pointed tellingly to the hundreds of millions of dollars CRT decisions
allocate. The members of this tribunal are appointed to fixed terms of office by the Librarian of
Congress in consultation with the Register of Copyrights – who is also appointed by the Librarian
of Congress. They are removable by the Librarian only “for cause.”
The PCAOB case is no formal obstacle to this arrangement, as the Librarian is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and, so far as appears, may be removed
by him from office for any reason (or no reason at all). Nonetheless, one could question whether
the Librarian is, in constitutional terms, the “Head of [a] Department” in the executive branch,
appropriately invested with the authority to appoint “inferior officers” responsible for lawexecution (which the members of the Copyright Tribunal certainly are). His office is the only
link between the CRT and the President. Yet also within its purview, doubtless considered by
Congress the more important and sacrosanct elements of its responsibilities, are such clearly nonexecutive bodies as the Congressional Research Service. What political controls can the
President effectively exercise over the administrator responsible for that congressional resource?
The realities make it hard to think that the Library of Congress will be regarded as a
constitutional “Department,” in the Head of which the appointment of officials with functions
like the CRT’s may constitutionally be vested. Else Congress would have learned its dangerous
lesson.
It is clear enough that the Librarian is not your ordinary politically responsible subordinate
of the President. Although (nominally) a presidential appointment since 1802, it was not until
1897 that Senate approval of his appointment was required (by the same act as first gave him sole
responsibility for making the institution's rules and regulations and appointing its staff). Not
arguably a department during its first century, them. Nor have its Librarians been treated as
political appointees. Librarians are not politicians or even professional librarians, but leading
literary figures like Archibald MacLeish. Dr. James Hadley Billington, the Librarian today, was
a highly respected academic historian and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars when he was appointed in September 1987, during the presidency of the first
President George Bush. His extended tenure since then reflects the proposition, celebrated on
the Library’s web site, that “in the twentieth century the precedent seems to have been established
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that a Librarian of Congress is appointed for life.”80
“One level of ‘for cause’ removal protection,” then, seems likely to fail as a sufficient
condition, just as it cannot be, considered in relation to individual officers and not the institutions
of which they may be members, a necessary test. Because we are committed to a unitary
executive, we will always have to be able to demonstrate effect lines of communication and
influence between executive department actors and the President that are supportive of the
President’s responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Nonetheless, having
only one level of “for cause” protection does not establish that those lines are present, and – in
relation to individual officers – having two levels does not establish that they are absent.
Inspectors General must and will survive, as will administrative law judges, and bureau chiefs
with tenure protection but lacking the institutional status of a PCAOB. These are enduring, longestablished constraints that neither aggrandize the Congress nor prevent effective law-execution.
More than a century’s practice has established that they do not deny the President’s necessary
role.81 In this respect the situation of the Library and the Librarian of Congress is quite
different.82
CONCLUSION
In the end, the majority’s solution in PCAOB appears to have avoided large disruptions to the
institutions whose responsibilities were immediately before them, rescuing every element of the
PCAOB’s authority save the formal tenure protection of its members. Treating the SEC
Commissioners as protected from removal save “for cause,” however surprising for Justices
usually disposed to leave the writing of laws to Congress, is itself a beneficial step. One would
have to look long and hard to find developed systems anywhere in the world that deliver financial
institutions into politicians’ direct control. Control of the markets and of the money supply is
not safe in their hands. This is a judgment Congress made as early as the first Bank of the United
States and continued with the Federal Reserve. The Constitution does not require otherwise and
the Court avoided the least suggestion otherwise.
As to the general question what the Constitution provides about the relationship between
President and the Departments of executive government, in some respects matters are more
settled than they had been at the beginning of the year. Looking at the propositions on which all
nine Justices agree, one can see the independent regulatory commissions now clearly placed
where they should be – not a “headless fourth branch,” but elements of the executive branch in
a different – but necessary – oversight relationship with the President. The Supreme Court’s
most important function, as Charles Black once remarked, lies in its legitimation of Congress’s
choices, not the opposite. If a marginal element of congressional choice fails the test, that has
far less significance than a judgment pulling the string on an extraordinary range of longestablished institutions.
But of just what does that necessary relationship consist? Between the majority’s strange
refusal to say, flat out, that its conclusion entailed a presidential right to demand “Opinions in
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writing” from the SEC83 and the ambiguities of its two-level formulation, much remains
unresolved.
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